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CHOOSING FAME OVER FAMILY 
Peter Mack, Geoff McNutt, John Vasuta and Michael Song∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fame of two or more commonly owned trademarks is a 
powerful weapon in the trademark owner’s enforcement arsenal if the 
trademarks have a particular feature or element in common.  Indeed, 
recent developments in the law of trademarks suggest that the fame of 
the senior user’s group of marks with a common element is a more 
significant factor in a likelihood of confusion analysis than the senior 
user’s ability to establish that it owns a “family of marks.” 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has defined a “family 
of marks” as: 
[A] group of marks having a recognizable common characteristic, 
wherein the marks are composed and used in such a way that the 
public associates not only the individual marks, but the common 
characteristic of the family, with the trademark owner.  Simply using a 
series of similar marks does not of itself establish the existence of a 
family.  There must be a recognition among the purchasing public that 
the common characteristic is indicative of a common origin of the 
goods.1 
The common characteristic can be a common prefix, suffix, or 
syllable.2  The owner of a family of marks may rely upon the presence in 
its marks of this common element to assert likelihood of confusion as 
against another trademark that also contains the common element, even 
if the other trademark as a whole is otherwise not similar in sound, 
appearance or overall commercial impression to any single mark in the 
 
∗ Peter Mack is a partner, and Geoff McNutt is an attorney with Foley & Lardner, Washington, D.C.  
John Vasuta is Chief IP Counsel with Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., Akron, Ohio.  Michael 
Song is a student at George Mason University School of Law and a clerk with Foley & Lardner. 
 1. J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 2. Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 395 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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family.3 
In deciding questions of likelihood of confusion, courts must often 
place themselves “in the position of an average purchaser or prospective 
purchaser in an attempt to understand what the normal reaction would be 
to the marks as they are encountered in the marketplace or in 
promotional and advertising material.”4  Thus, the proponent must show 
by competent evidence: (1) that prior to the entry into the field of the 
opponent’s mark, all or many of the marks in the alleged family were 
used and promoted together in such a way as to create a public 
perception of the common element as an indication of common source; 
and (2) that the common element is distinctive.5 
Because the proponent must prove use and promotion, evidence in 
the nature of sales and advertising expenditures is often crucial to the 
court’s determination of whether a family of marks exists.6  This 
evidence, however, also may be used to show the fame of the marks.7  
The fame of a mark is one of the factors that courts weigh when 
determining the strength of the trademark, an important factor in any 
likelihood of confusion analysis.8  Similarly, the establishment of a 
family of marks may demonstrate the strength of the group of marks.9 
Establishing a family of marks can be difficult because of the need 
to show joint advertising of the family of marks, the distinctiveness of 
 
 3. See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. McClain, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1274 (TTAB 1995) (finding that 
the registration of “McClaim” for legal services infringed upon McDonald’s Corporation “MC” 
family mark); Geoffrey, Inc. v. Stratton, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1691 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that the 
registration of “PHONES-R-US” infringed upon the “R US” family mark found in Geoffrey 
Incorporated’s KIDS “R” US and TOYS “R” US”). 
 4. American Standard Inc. v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 457, 461 (TTAB 1978). 
 5. Marion Laboratories, Inc. v. Biochemical/Diagnostics, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215, 1218-19 
(TTAB 1988).  See also Polaroid Corp. v. American Screen Process Equip. Co., 166 U.S.P.Q. 151, 
154 (TTAB 1970); J & J Snack Foods, 932 F.2d at 1463 (finding that “[i]t is thus necessary to 
consider the use, advertisement, and distinctiveness of the marks” when determining whether a 
family of marks has been established). 
 6. See Polaroid, 166 U.S.P.Q. at 154 (stating that “it has not been shown that the various 
marks asserted to comprise said ‘family’ or, at least, a goodly number of them, have become 
familiar or known in the photography field as a result of sales or constant exposure through 
advertising and promotion”); Witco Chemical Co. v. Chemische Werke Witten G.M.B.H., 158 
U.S.P.Q. 157, 160 (TTAB 1968) (finding that “we look primarily to the nature and character of 
opposer’s advertising and promotional material and any evidence pertaining to purchaser reaction 
thereto and exposure to the marks over the years” to establish a family of marks). 
 7. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 8. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973). 
 9. Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 442 (D. Or. 1978) (holdinging 
that “[t]he use of ‘Dictaphone’ together with other marks having ‘Dict-’ or ‘Dicta-’ as a prefix 
strengthens Dictaphone’ and increases the likelihood of confusion between ‘Dictaphone’ and 
‘Dictamatic[]’”). 
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the common element, and the consumer’s association of marks 
containing the common element with a single source of origin.10  
Furthermore, a judicial finding that a family of marks exists does not 
necessarily guarantee an adjudication that confusion is likely, as other 
factors must also be weighed in this determination.11 
Fame, on the other hand, is a dominant factor in a likelihood of 
confusion analysis.12  Thus, because establishing a family of marks may 
be difficult, courts and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) have recently focused their analyses on the fame of a group of 
marks when determining likelihood of confusion, even in cases 
involving a group of marks having a common element or common 
unifying theme. 
II. DIFFICULTY IN PROVING A FAMILY OF MARKS 
Older cases appear hostile to the family of marks doctrine.13  
Although more recent cases have been more objective and receptive to 
the doctrine, proving the existence of a family of marks is challenging.14  
Some of the reasons why courts have refused to apply the family of 
marks doctrine include: (i) the lack of distinctiveness of the common 
element; (ii) differences between the parties’ goods; and (iii) the lack of 
conjoint advertising establishing a common ownership in the mind of the 
consumer. 
A. Distinctiveness of the Common Element 
One of the most frequent reasons for courts to reject the existence 
of a family of marks is the lack of distinctiveness of the common 
element.  This is because the family of marks doctrine is bottomed on 
the notion that the common feature is a distinctive feature of each 
mark.15  Thus, a common element that is merely descriptive or highly 
 
 10. Marion Labs, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1218-19. 
 11. In re E.I. DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (providing thirteen factors to help determine whether 
a likelihood of confusion exists). 
 12. Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that FIDO-LAY for 
dog treats was likely to be confused with FRITO-LAY for human snack food). 
 13. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
23:61 (4th ed. 2003); Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55, 59 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating that some 
courts have “squinted” at the possibility of acquiring rights in a family of marks). 
 14. See MCCARTHY, supra note 13, at § 23:61. 
 15. American Standard Inc. v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 457, 461 (TTAB 1978).  See 
also Champion Int’l Corp. v. Plexowood, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 160, 163 (TTAB 1976) (holding that 
the nature and significance of the prefix FLEX- for flexible material “raises a question as to whether 
[a family of marks] theory can be bottomed on such a term”). 
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suggestive cannot serve as the distinctive feature of a family of marks.  
For example, in Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan Inc., the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the suffix JET for spray 
nozzles was descriptive, such that there could be no family of marks 
despite evidence of substantial sales and market share.16  Similarly, in 
American Standard Inc. v. Scott & Fetzer Co., the TTAB held that the 
prefix AQUA was highly suggestive for water faucets and thus could not 
serve as a distinctive feature of a family of marks.17 
Courts have also refused to find a family of marks when the mark is 
commonly used in the trade.  For example, in Servo Corp. of America v. 
Servo-Tex Products. Co., the court held that the prefix SERVO is 
commonly used in the industry as an abbreviation for servomotor or 
servomechanism such that it could not serve to distinguish a family of 
marks.18 
In addition, if the common element is widely used for a variety of 
products, courts may find that the common element is incapable of 
establishing a family of marks.  For example, in Creamette Co. v. 
Merlino, the Ninth Circuit held that the suffix ETTES (or even ET or 
ETTE) was so widely used for a variety of products and “capable of 
being used with such an infinite variety of wholly dissimilar words that 
[the court doubted] it could ever be a feature of a ‘family’ of marks to be 
used on any line of goods.”19 
Courts have found a family of marks, however, when the common 
element is suggestive.  For example, in Duffy-Mott Co. v. Borden, Inc., 
the TTAB stated that, while the suffix MATO for tomato drinks may “at 
first blush” seem to be a little too suggestive, the suffix had been 
“exploited . . . to enhance public recognition of this verbal feature as 
indicating origin of certain beverages.”20  Similarly, in Reynolds & 
Reynolds Co. v. I.E. Systems Inc., the TTAB stated, “[w]hile ACCU no 
doubt has a suggestive connotation, it is not so highly suggestive as to 
 
 16. Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 395 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 17. American Standard, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 461.  See also Spraying Systems, 975 F.2d at 395 
(holding that the suffix JET for spray nozzles was descriptive and the owner had not proven 
secondary meaning such that there could be no family of marks despite evidence of substantial sales 
and market share). 
 18. Servo Corp. of Am. v. Servo-Tex Prods. Co., 289 F.2d 955, 956 (CCPA 1961) (holding 
that because SERVO is commonly used as an abbreviation for servomotor or servomechanism, it is 
descriptive). 
 19. Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55, 59 (9th Cir. 1962); See also Quaker Oats Co. v. 
General Mills, Inc., 134 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1943) (holding the suffix “ies” not exclusive to the 
registered trademark of “Wheaties”). 
 20. Duffy-Mott Co., Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 846, 850 (TTAB 1978). 
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impair its ability to serve as the basis for a family of marks.”21 
In sum, because a party relying upon the family of marks doctrine 
must establish that the purchasing public associates the common 
element, as well as the whole trademark, with the owner of the family of 
marks; this common element must be distinctive.  Hence, a common 
element which is merely descriptive, highly suggestive, or is commonly 
used in the industry or on a variety of products, usually cannot establish 
a family of marks. 
B. Differences in the Goods 
Another difficulty in asserting the family of marks doctrine occurs 
when the marks containing the common element identify goods or 
services that are different from the goods or services of the alleged 
infringer.  These differences undermine the recognition among the 
purchasing public that the common element is indicative of a single 
source of origin, and thus may preclude establishment of a family of 
marks. 
For example, in Witco Chemical Co. v. Chemische Werke Witten 
G.M.B.H, the opposer’s marks containing the prefix WIT identified 
various chemical compounds, including products in the paint industry, 
petroleum industry, ink industry, and textile industry.22  The TTAB, 
however, discounted many of the opposer’s marks because they were not 
used to identify the same type of goods that applicant’s marks identified, 
namely synthetic detergents.23  Thus, although the opposer sold many 
products with the WIT prefix, although the opposer also sold synthetic 
detergents under other marks not containing the common element, and 
although the opposer owned one mark (WITCO) that identified synthetic 
detergents, the TTAB held that this evidence was insufficient to 
establish a family of marks.24 
Some courts have also drawn narrow distinctions between related 
goods to find that there is no likelihood of confusion, even if the 
existence of a family of marks has been established.  For example, in 
 
 21. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. I.E. Systems Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1749, 1751 (TTAB 1987).  
See also Marion Laboratories Inc. v. Biochemical/Diagnostics Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1215 (TTAB 
1988) (holding that the suggestive prefix TOXI- for products related to clinical laboratory testing 
for drugs may serve as a common element). 
 22. Witco Chemical Co. v. Chemische Werke Witten G.M.B.H, 158 U.S.P.Q. 157, 160 
(TTAB 1968). 
 23. Id. at 161. 
 24. Id. 
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Reynolds,25 the TTAB dismissed an opposition against an application to 
register the mark ACCULINK for a computer program for asynchronous 
communications use.  The opposer had shown that it owned a family of 
marks containing ACCU for computerized accounting programs.26  The 
TTAB ruled against the opposer, however, on the ground that the 
specific type of software for operational uses was sufficiently different 
from software for accounting purposes as to negate a likelihood of 
confusion.27 
Similarly, in Consolidated Foods Corp. v. Sherwood Medical 
Industries Inc., the TTAB held that, even assuming that the use of the 
suffix SICLE for frozen confectionaries was sufficient to establish a 
family of marks, a medical patient preparation sponge is such a 
“radically” different product as to negate likelihood of confusion with 
respect to the family of marks.28 
In sum, because the consumer must associate the common element 
with a common origin of goods, differences in the parties’ goods may 
undermine reliance on the family of marks doctrine.  Moreover, even if a 
family of marks is established, tribunals may find that there is no 
likelihood of confusion as between the family of marks and an allegedly 
infringing mark because of differences in the parties’ goods. 
C. Joint Advertising 
Another difficulty in establishing a family of marks is the necessity 
of showing conjoint advertising or promotion.  This conjoint use and 
advertising must also demonstrate that the consuming public associates 
the common element with a single source of origin. 
For example, in White Heather Distillers Ltd. v. American 
Distilling Co., the TTAB stated that two marks bearing the common 
word HEATHER for scotch whiskey, “can hardly be deemed a ‘family’ 
of marks within the accepted concept of the term, if for no other reason 
than that the opposer has submitted no testimony, and the record fails to 
indicate that these marks have ever been advertised together in any 
manner apprised to project the impression that they all belong to the 
same party . . . by reason of the common word HEATHER.”29 
 
 25. Reynolds & Reynolds, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1751. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 1752. 
 28. Consol. Foods Corp. v. Sherwood Med. Indus. Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. 279, 282 (TTAB 1973) 
(holding that the evidence did not establish a family of marks). 
 29. White Heather Distillers Ltd. v. Am. Distilling Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 466, 470 (TTAB 1978).  
See also Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 195 U.S.P.Q. 665, 667-68 (TTAB 1977) 
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The tribunals have also held that, even if two or more of the marks 
in the alleged family have been promoted together, the nature and 
character of the advertising and promotional material must establish that 
the consuming public would believe that any mark containing the 
common element came from a the same source.  For example, in Moore 
Business Forms, Inc. v. Rogersnap Business Forms, Inc., the TTAB held 
that a brochure and other individual advertisements only referenced at 
most two of the marks in the alleged family.30  Thus, despite the alleged 
use and promotion of sixteen marks, each containing the prefix SPEEDI, 
the Board held that this conjoint advertising of only one or two at a time 
did not establish a family of marks.31 
Furthermore, even if two or more of the marks have been promoted 
together, the intermingling of these marks with other marks missing the 
common element may undermine reliance on the family of marks 
doctrine.  For example, in Dap, Inc. v. Flex-O-Glass, Inc., the TTAB 
stated that, despite the joint promotion of two or three marks bearing the 
alleged common element, the marks “have been so intermixed or 
intermingled with other of applicant’s marks that do not contain the 
[common element] as to seriously dilute or diminish any possible 
consumer recognition that applicant possesses a family of . . . marks.”32 
III. FAME LIGHTENS THE TRADEMARK OWNER’S BURDEN 
Because of the stringent requirements for establishing a family of 
marks, tribunals have sometimes focused on the strength of the group of 
marks, rather than the establishment of a family.  For example, in 
Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., the court stated, “[i]n 
determining the effect of the use of the ‘Dicta-’ word family, it is not 
necessary to rule on the viability of the so-called ‘family of marks’ 
doctrine.  It is sufficient to say merely that the use of a trademark 
together with a group of marks having the same prefix can enhance the 
strength of the trademark.”33 
 
(finding no “conjoint” use where the marks were not promoted together or in association with each 
other). 
 30. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Rogersnap Bus. Forms, Inc., 163 U.S.P.Q. 303, 308 (TTAB 
1969) (finding likelihood of confusion based on similarity of marks, not similarity to family of 
marks). 
 31. Id. at 304. 
 32. Dap, Inc. v. Flex-O-Glass, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 266, 270 (TTAB 1976).  See also 
Mallinckrodt, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 668 (finding that promotional pictures displaying three of the alleged 
family marks together with eight other marks was insufficient to establish that these marks have 
come to be recognized and associated together by the purchasing public). 
 33. Dictaphone Corp. v. Dictamatic Corp., 199 U.S.P.Q. 437, 442 (D. Or. 1978) (stating that 
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The strength of trademarks can often be demonstrated by another 
factor that depends on evidence of extensive use, advertising, and 
promotion; namely, the fame of the mark.34  Obviously, despite the 
somewhat similar evidence needed to establish either a family of marks 
or the fame of a group of marks having a common element, there are 
differences between the two doctrines. 
For instance, famous marks need not be unique, because the fame 
or recognition may overshadow similar marks owned by others.35  In 
addition, famous marks may enjoy an enhanced scope of legal protection 
because consumers may come to associate the famous mark with diverse 
products.36  “A strong mark . . . casts a long shadow which competitors 
must avoid.”37 
Some tribunals have relied upon the fame of a set of marks to lower 
the bar for a party to establish either a family of marks or a likelihood of 
confusion.  While these cases have not always explicitly relied on the 
fame of the marks as a determining factor, they have relied on such 
evidence of fame to overcome some of the difficulties in asserting the 
family of marks doctrine.  These difficulties include the distinctiveness 
of the common element or the application of a family of marks to 
unrelated goods. 
A. Distinctiveness of the Common Element 
One way in which fame lowers the bar is to allow challenges based 
on likelihood of confusion to a newcomer’s adoption of a descriptive or 
commonly used element that also happens to be the unifying theme of 
 
“[t]he use of ‘Dictaphone’ together with other marks having ‘Dict-’ or ‘Dicta-’ as a prefix 
strengthens ‘Dictaphone’ and increases the likelihood of confusion between ‘Dictaphone’ and 
‘Dictamatic[]’”). 
 34. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 35. See Tiffany & Co. v. Classic Motor Carriages, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1835, 1840-41 (TTAB 
1989) (holding that the long use and advertising, and substantial publicity of the TIFFANY mark 
established a likelihood of confusion despite the fact the TIFFANY is not a unique name); Polo 
Fashions Inc. v. La Loren, Inc., 224 U.S.P.Q. 509, 512 (TTAB 1984) (holding that the sales and 
advertising expenditures is evidence of the significance of the LOREN marks in the marketplace 
and that it is more than adequate to rebut any inference of the third party uses of LOR for clothing 
and toiletries). 
 36. Tiffany & Co., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840-41 (holding that the famous TIFFANY mark for 
jewelry was likely to be infringed by CLASSIC TIFFANY for automobiles); Harley-Davidson 
Motor Co., v. Pierce Foods Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q. 857, 862-63 (TTAB 1986) (holding that due to the 
long use and extensive promotion of the HARLEY-DAVIDSON mark and HARLEY or HOG 
nicknames for motorcycles, a consumer would likely be confused with the mark HARLEY-HOG 
for pork products). 
 37. Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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the senior user’s group of famous marks.  This may occur through the 
well-known doctrine of secondary meaning. 
For example, in Aloe Crème Laboratories, Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., the 
TTAB held that an opposer had established a family of marks 
characterized by the prefix ALO, despite the common element being the 
phonetic spelling of the generic name for an ingredient in the applicant’s 
and opposer’s goods, namely aloe in cosmetic products.38  The Board 
held that “because of the original, and for many years, exclusive 
adoption by opposer of a long list of ALO prefixed marks . . . and 
opposer’s long and extensive use and advertising of these marks, many 
of which in concert, . . . it must be held that each of opposer’s ALO 
trademarked products acquired a ‘secondary meaning’ denoting products 
originating from opposer.”39  The Board also stated that this same 
evidence not only showed secondary meaning, but also showed that the 
opposer had established a family of marks.40 
Although a showing of secondary meaning is not completely 
synonymous with fame, these are similar concepts, in that both involve 
proof of long-time use, extensive sales and significant advertising or 
promotion.  In sum, a showing of secondary meaning may allow even a 
common element that is descriptive to form the basis for a finding of 
likelihood of confusion. 
B. Different Goods 
Even if the goods identified by the group of trademarks are not 
related to the goods identified by the allegedly conflicting mark, the 
fame of a group of marks having a common element may also make it 
easier to prove likelihood of confusion. 
One example of a well-known family of marks is the MC and MAC 
marks owned by McDonald’s Corp, the fast-food restaurant chain.41  
Because of the fame of this group of marks, both the TTAB and the 
courts have found a likelihood of confusion with respect to other marks 
that also contain the MC or MAC component, even if the other marks 
identify completely unrelated goods and services. 
In McDonald’s Corp. v. McClain, the TTAB held that, while 
“ordinary people would certainly not mistake legal services for fast food 
chain restaurant services, we think some sort of a connection with 
 
 38. Aloe Crème Laboratories, Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. 316, 326 (TTAB 1975). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See MCCARTHY, supra note 13, at § 23:61. 
9
Mack et al.: Choosing Fame Over Family
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
VASUTA1.DOC 4/5/2004  11:19 AM 
212 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:203 
[McDonald’s] would be falsely assumed because of the similarity of [the 
mark MCCLAIM] to the members of [McDonald’s] famous family of 
‘Mc’ marks.”42  Similarly, in McDonald’s Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, 
DDS., P.C., the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New 
York found that the mark MCDENTAL infringed McDonald’s family of 
marks, despite the lack of any evidence of the proximity of the products 
or the likelihood that McDonald’s will ever enter the field of dental 
services.43  The court held that the McDonald’s family of marks was 
strong due to the widespread familiarity of the public with McDonald’s 
use of “Mc” language.44 
Similarly, in International Diagnostic Tech., Inc. v. Miles 
Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s reliance on 
the fame of group of marks to establish a family of marks, even though 
the goods of the parties were different.45  The court stated: 
The board added that the evidence demonstrates ‘the renown of 
opposer’s [Miles’] line of –STIX products acquired over many years of 
use and through sales in the hundreds of millions of dollars’ and that 
Miles ‘has also spent millions of dollars in advertising its products 
through various media.’  Accordingly, it concluded that International’s 
mark, used in connection with samplers employed with its diagnostic 
equipment, so resembles Miles’ –STIX family of marks for Miles’ 
diagnostic reagent strips that confusion is likely.46 
Although the court and the TTAB found that the different products 
did have some striking similarities, the fame of the marks aided their 
determination that confusion was likely despite the differences in the 
parties’ goods.47 
In sum, famous marks are entitled to a broader scope of protection 
than other marks, and thus the protection extends to a wider variety of 
products.  Courts have applied this general principle to a group of 
famous marks having a common element or unifying theme, overcoming 
the difficulty in establishing a likelihood of confusion with respect to 
other marks that identify unrelated goods or services. 
 
 42. McDonald’s Corp. v. McClain, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1274, 1276 (TTAB 1995). 
 43. McDonald’s Corp. v. Druck & Gerner, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
 44. Id. at 1134.  See also Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 221 
(D. Md. 1988) (holding that there was a likelihood of confusion between MCSLEEP and 
McDonald’s family of marks). 
 45. Int’l Diagnostic Tech., Inc. v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 746 F.2d 798, 800 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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IV. CHOOSING FAME OVER FAMILY 
A. Courts 
When analyzing single marks, courts often consider fame as a 
“dominant factor” in a likelihood of confusion analysis.48  Courts have 
also recently concentrated on the fame of a group of marks to establish 
the strength of the group of marks, rather than to rely on the family of 
marks doctrine. 
For example, the case of Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enterprises, 
Inc.,49 involved an opposition to the registration of the mark VITTORIO 
RICCI for various clothing and accessories, shoes, and retail store 
services.  The opposer owned several marks including NINA RICCI, 
SIGNORICCI, and CAPRICCI for perfumes, toiletries, and cosmetic 
products.50  The opposer also owned the mark MADEMOISELLE 
RICCI for a wide variety of clothing and accessories for women.51 
In the decision below, the TTAB found that the components 
VITTORIO and NINA of the respective marks were obviously different 
in sound, appearance, and connotation.52  The TTAB also accorded little 
or no importance to the increasing sales of items under the opposer’s 
marks.53  Although the TTAB also recognized that the common element 
RICCI was identical in the respective marks of the two parties, the 
TTAB nonetheless dismissed the opposition.54 
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the TTAB had failed to 
consider the other marks of the opposer and their effect on the likelihood 
of confusion analysis.55  Nina Ricci argued that these other marks 
indicate that the RICCI suffix is a “unifying name” in the opposer’s 
marks and the dominant and significant part of opposer’s marks in 
identifying its goods.56  The Federal Circuit, without even discussing 
whether or not the opposer had established a family of marks, concluded 
that the opposer had demonstrated that there was a likelihood of 
confusion between NINA RICCI “and related marks,” and the 
 
 48. Recot Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that FIDO-LAY for 
dog treats was likely to be confused with FRITO-LAY for human snack food). 
 49. Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 50. Id. at 1902. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1903. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Nina Ricci, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1903. 
 56. Id. 
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applicant’s VITTORIO RICCI.57  In reaching its conclusion, the court 
reiterated that “there is no excuse for even approaching a well-known 
trademark of a competitor . . . and all doubt as to whether confusion, 
mistake, or deception is likely is to be resolved against the newcomer, 
especially where the established mark is one which is famous.”58 
Similarly, the recent case of Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., 
Inc.,59 began as an opposition to an applicant’s attempt to register the 
mark POWERWAVE for amplifiers and power amplifiers.  The opposer, 
Bose, owned the mark WAVE for audio goods including, radios, clock 
radios, audio tape recorders and players, portable radio and cassette 
recorder combinations, compact stereo systems and portable compact 
disc players, and the mark ACOUSTIC WAVE for loudspeaker systems 
and music systems consisting of a loudspeaker system and amplifier and 
at least one of a radio tuner, compact disc player, and audio tape cassette 
player.60 
In the proceeding below, the TTAB held that Bose failed to 
establish the fame of its marks WAVE and POWER WAVE.61  The 
TTAB also found that both marks, by including WAVE, were suggestive 
of sound waves and radio waves.62  The TTAB also found the 
applicant’s POWERWAVE mark to be suggestive and went on to hold 
that the marks of the respective parties were different enough in sound 
and connotation as to create distinctly different commercial 
impressions.63 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the opposer’s 
marks were “famous and entitled to broad protection.”64  Rather than 
addressing whether the opposer’s marks formed a family, the court 
stated, “[t]he presence of the root element WAVE upon this court’s 
review, introduces a strong similarity in all three marks.”65  In particular, 
the court held that the presence of WAVE in POWERWAVE conveyed 
the same overall impression as WAVE in the opposer’s marks and that 
the additional component POWER was insufficient to overcome this 
 
 57. Id. at 1903-04. 
 58. Id. at 1904 (quoting Planter’s Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 916, 
924-25 (CCPA 1962)). 
 59. Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 60. Id. at 1369. 
 61. Id. at 1373. 
 62. Id. at 1377. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1376. 
 65. Bose Corp., 293 F.3d  at 1378 (emphasis added). 
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similar impression.66  Thus, in finding likelihood of confusion, the 
Federal Circuit relied on both the fame of the marks—as well as the 
common “root element” WAVE—rather than on the family of marks 
doctrine. 
In sum, both Nina Ricci and Bose illustrate the Federal Circuit’s 
focus on fame rather than the family of marks doctrine in determining 
likelihood of confusion.  Both these cases involved marks with a 
“unifying theme” or “common root element”; and yet, although the 
family of marks doctrine appeared to be a potentially viable theory in 
each case, the court did not even mention it. 
B. TTAB 
In the recent case of Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire, 
LLC v. Silverstone Berhad,67 the Board followed the Federal Circuit’s 
lead in focusing on the fame of a group of marks rather than on the 
question of whether the group of marks represented a family of marks.  
This case involved a set of consolidated proceedings in the nature of 
oppositions to a series of applications to register SILVERSTONE for 
tires.68  The opposers owned the names and marks FIRESTONE and 
BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE for tires, thereby creating a common 
unifying theme characterized by the “STONE” suffix.69 
The TTAB sustained the oppositions based not only on the fame of 
the FIRESTONE and BRIDGESTONE/FIRESTONE marks and names 
but also on the common STONE suffix.70  While the TTAB noted that 
the opposers were “essentially asserting a family of “‘STONE’-suffixed 
marks,” it did not analyze the case under the family of marks doctrine.71 
Instead, the TTAB focused on the fame of the group of marks and 
found a likelihood of confusion even though there were substantial 
differences in sound, appearance, or meaning between the marks of the 
respective parties.72  Also, while the applicant had introduced some 
evidence of third party use of the component STONE in the general 
automotive industry, the TTAB noted that these uses were irrelevant 
either to the applicant’s or to the opposers’ uses of their respective marks 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC v. Silverstone Berhad, 2003 WL 1559659 
(TTAB 2003). 
 68. Id. at *1. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at *10 (also holding that SILVERSTONE was primarily merely a surname). 
 71. Id. at *9. 
 72. Id. 
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for tires.73 
The TTAB also relied on the opposers’ use of their STONE suffix 
in a multi-brand marketing strategy – thus establishing conjoint 
promotion and association.74  Nevertheless, rather than relying on the 
family of marks doctrine, the TTAB instead focused on the fame of the 
marks, which was clearly evident from the record.75  The TTAB 
reiterated that there is “no excuse for even approaching the well-known 
trademark of a competitor . . . and all doubt as to whether confusion, 
mistake, or deception is likely is to be resolved against the newcomer, 
especially when the established mark is one which is famous.”76 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the fame of a group of marks characterized by a 
common element is a dominant factor in a likelihood of confusion 
analysis, not only strengthening the mark, but also easing the burden in 
proving likelihood of confusion.  Recently, the courts, and particularly 
the Federal Circuit, have tended to focus on the fame of a group of 
marks having a common element rather than on a family of marks 
theory.  The TTAB has followed the Federal Circuit’s lead and has given 
much weight to the fame of a group of marks that contain a common 
element, without requiring the senior user to establish that it owns a 
family of marks. 
 
 73. Bridgestone/Firestone, 2003 WL 1559659 at *11. 
 74. Id. at *10. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (quoting Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus. Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 
1992)). 
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